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Abstract: In this paper, we estimate the dynamic equilibrium debt level for China’s 
non-financial corporates using an error correction model (ECM), and then analyse 
China’s corporate deleveraging and its consequence. Furthermore, we examine the 
effects of macroeconomic policies on China’s corporate deleveraging with a VAR 
model. The empirical results suggest that contractive monetary policy and fiscal 
policy rather than easy macroeconomic policies help reduce the non-financial 
corporate leverage in China.   
 
Keywords: Corporate Deleveraging; VAR/VEC Model; Dynamic Equilibrium Debt 
Level; Macroeconomic Policies; China’s Economy 
 
JEL Code:  E62, E63, E32 
 
 
           
  
                                                             
1
 Lixin Sun (corresponding author) is an associate professor of macroeconomics from the Center for Economic 
Research, Shandong University. E-mail: sunlixin@gsm.pku.edu.cn or lxsun@sdu.edu.cn. Address: The Center for 
Economic Research, Shandong University, 27# Shandananlu, Jinan, 250100, P.R.China 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
The increasing leverage of China’s non-financial firm sector in recent years has 
attained more concerns over the process and the measures of corporate deleveraging 
in China. In this paper, first, we estimate the dynamic equilibrium debt level for 
China’s non-financial corporate sector using a VEC model. Comparing the actual 
non-financial corporate debt level with the equilibrium level, we analyse whether, 
when and how much to deleverage for the firm sector. Furthermore, we examine the 
effects of China’s macroeconomic policies on corporate deleveraging with a VAR 
model, and thereby providing policy suggestions.  
Deleveraging in China has some special situations that should be considered. The 
indebtedness of local governments has attained concerns recently, but given that the 
leverage of China’s central government is low, at the general government level the 
ratio of public debt to GDP was approximately 40% at the end of 2014, so China’s 
public debt is mild and sustainable by the international standards. However, the 
private non-financial debt has a different story. It reached 192.69% at the end of 2014 
(percent to GDP), to which household debt (36.01% at the end of 2014) contributed 
less and non-financial corporate debt contributed more, the latter had attained 
approximately 156.68% by the end of 2014, which is one of the highest level around 
the world. That’s why our study focuses on China’s corporate deleveraging. Secondly, 
the increasing corporate leverage in recent year was mainly driven by a huge 
monetary and fiscal stimulus package taken by Chinese government for weathering 
against the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, not driven by market incentives likely in 
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most advanced economies. Thirdly, China’s large non-financial firms and main 
commercial banks are state-owned, which could imply different pass-through for 
corporate deleveraging from that occurred in advanced countries. All these motivated 
our study on China’s corporate deleveraging to extend the findings in literature on 
private debt deleveraging.  
Our contributions in this paper are: 1) using temporal disaggregating approaches, 
we compiled a complete quarterly data series for China’s corporate debt level (percent 
to GDP) since 1985q1, which set up a data foundation for our and other future 
empirical studies. 2) By identifying the long-run relationships between the corporate 
debt level and the fundamental macroeconomic variables with a Vector Error 
Correction model, we calculated the dynamic equilibrium (sustainable) debt level of 
China’s non-financial corporates for the first time. The gap between the actual 
corporate debt level and the estimated equilibrium debt values measures the corporate 
deleveraging space to be filled, which would lead to a remarkable decline in China’s 
growth rate of GDP in the future. 3) Our tests on the effects of monetary and fiscal 
policy shocks on corporate deleveraging suggest that contractionary macroeconomic 
policies help reduce China’s non-financial corporate leverage in the context of unique 
transmission channels of macroeconomic policies and special economic structure 
where state-owned non-financial firms and commercial banks  dominate China 
economy.  
    The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
literature on deleveraging process and approaches. Section 3 descripts data and the 
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stylized facts. Section 4 estimates the dynamic equilibrium level for China’s 
non-financial corporate debt. Section 5 examines the impacts of monetary and fiscal 
policies on corporate deleveraging. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
Leverage is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, a sustainable debt level for both 
the public sector and the private sector is not only the precondition but also the 
routine measures for improving public service and fostering economic growth. On the 
other hand, the overindebtedness could lead to default and bankruptcy, depressing the 
economic growth, producing economic instability and fluctuations, even could be 
followed by crises and disasters
2
. Therefore, a deleveraging process must occur if the 
debt level and debt burden are unsustainable. These rules also apply to corporate 
leverage and deleverage.  
Although there have been many deleveraging processes throughout history to 
learn from, economists and policy-makers do not understand very well how those 
processes work, they often have a painful trial and error experience in deleveraging 
practice. Reihart et al. (2015) classified the deleveraging strategies mainly for public 
sector
3
 into two groups, the first is orthodox strategy group comprising enhancing 
economic growth over the interest rate and running budget surplus. The second is 
heterodox strategy group, in which the deleveraging achieves through several 
processes or their mix including 1) debt reduction, 2) austerity, 3) debt monetization, 
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(2011), Clemons and Vague (2012).  
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 The private sector can apply the similar strategies.  
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and 4) wealth transfers
4
.  Debt reduction for deleveraging can be achieved directly 
by debt defaults and debt restructuring, which often severely harm the creditor’s 
benefits and could lead to a self-reinforcing deflation-depression spiral. Austerity is a 
natural and obvious choice for the overindebted private and public sector. To the 
public sector it means cutting the government expenditure and increasing the revenue, 
which implies a contractionary fiscal policy. To the private sector it also suggests the 
cut in spending or investing and the attempt to raise income. Historically, debt 
monetization by printing money is most frequent measure for deleveraging, which 
implies that an expansionary monetary policy frequently follows the excess 
indebtedness in the public or private sector. The recent notable example is the so 
called “Quantitative Ease” monetary policy taken by the FED, the Bank of England, 
and the European Central Bank. Ueda (2012) presents that a quickly and well 
monetization for deleveraging (like the US since 2008) derived much better results 
than those who did it late (like Japan since 1990s). Wealth transfer for deleveraging 
occurs in several forms, for example, increasing the tax burden on the riches to 
transfer the wealth from the haves to have-nots. For the firms, it can be carried out by 
financial support and tax reduction on those “too important to fail”. Above 
discussions and lots of literature show that macroeconomic policies play important 
roles in deleveraging (Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012; Bouis et al., 2013; Goretti et 
al., 2013; Benigno et al., 2014). Specifically, Benigno et al. (2014) simulated the 
effects of monetary policy and fiscal policy during a dynamic debt deleveraging 
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process in the household sector by generalizing a standard New Keynesian model. 
Their results suggest that an unconventional monetary policy with zero bound and a 
positive counter-cycle fiscal policy help accelerate the deleveraging.  
Using a financial model developed by Leland (1994), Zhang et al. (2015) 
calculated the optimal corporate leverage ratio (debt-to-asset) based on the firm level 
data. Their empirical results suggest that China’s corporate sector does not appear to 
be over-leveraged. They find that it is mainly state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that 
have increased leverage, while private enterprises have deleveraged in recent years, 
and the SOEs’ leveraging has been mainly driven by implicit government support 
amid lower funding costs than private enterprises. Chivakul and Lam (2015) assessed 
China’s corporate leverage and made a similar conclusion as in Zhang et al. (2015). 
To my knowledge, until now, no studies are conducted to explore the effects of 
macroeconomic policies on China’s corporate deleveraging, which motivates my 
study.     
 
3. Data and Stylized Facts 
The empirical studies on China’s debt issues have been constrained by the lack of 
detailed times series debt data. In this paper, we compiled a complete data serie for 
China’s non-financial corporate debt from the first quarter of 1992 to the second 
quarter of 2015, to match the available data for many other macroeconomic indicators, 
such as the growth rate of GDP, and so on. As such, we collect our data from several 
sources including official publications, international databases and individual 
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literature. The first database is the Bank for International Settlement database 
(hereafter BIS, 2015, entitled as the “Long series on total credit and domestic bank 
credit to the private nonfinancial sector” database), from which we compiled the total 
private non-financial sector debt data for whole period and the non-financial corporate 
debt for 2006-2015 period. The second group of dataset includes Clemons and Vague 
(2012) for the period after 2004 and He et al. (2012) for the 1999-2004 period. The 
data of non-financial corporate debt for the 1992-1998 period were proxied by the 
total loans to businesses from the database of the People’s Bank of China (hereafter 
the PBC, China’s Central Bank). Although BIS 2015 database provides quarterly data 
for non-financial corporate debt, it starts only from the first quarter of 2006. Therefore 
we have to disaggregate our annual data into quarterly for the 1992q1-2005q4 period.   
The complete annual data series for China’s non-financial private sector are 
depicted in Figure 1. Household debt had risen from 208.21 billion yuan (RMB) in 
1992 to 22921.56 billion yuan in 2014, increasing more than 10 times for this period. 
Non-financial corporate debt has increased approximately 43 times since 1992, rising 
from 2057.60 billion yuan in 1992 to 99720.04 billion yuan in 2014. Despite that both 
household debt and non-financial corporate debt have remained an uptrend since the 
1990s, it is the rapid increase in non-financial corporate debt that makes remarkable 
contributions to the rise in China’s private non-financial debt rather than the increase 
in household debt. 
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Figure 1 Household Debt, Non-financial Corporate Debt and Total Private 
Non-Financial Debt Stocks (Unit: Billion Yuan RMB) 
 
Source: Author’s Collection 
Figure 2 plots the evolutions in the ratios of household debt, non-financial 
corporate debt and total private non-financial debt to GDP from 1992 to 2014.  The 
non-financial private debt-to-GDP ratio had increased 80 percentages by the end of 
2014, attaining 192.69% of GDP. The ratio of household debt to GDP rose from 7.73% 
in 1992 to 36.01% in 2014 due to the increase in mortgage volumes. The leverage in 
the non-financial corporate sector has increased from 87.57% (to GDP) in 1992 to 
156.68% in 2014, which is one of the highest levels of corporate debt in the world.
5
 
The highest leverage in non-financial corporates may produce severe dragging effects 
on China’s sustainable economic growth. Figure 3 displays China’s growth rates of 
GDP since 1992q1. Comparing Figure 3 with Figure 2, we find that the slowing 
growth rate of GDP follows the increasing leverage ratio in China’s non-financial 
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corporate sector since 2008. This implies that a deleveraging process could be 
necessary for China to restore its long-run equilibrium growth. 
Figure 2 Evolutions of Household Debt, Non-Financial Corporate Debt and 
Private Non-Financial Debt 
 
Source: Author’s Collection 
       Figure 3 Growth Rates of GDP in China (1992-2015) 
 
Source: Wind Database 
As abovementioned, BIS (2015) database provides the quarterly data for China’s 
non-financial corporate debt only from the first quarter of 2006, we have to obtain the 
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complete quarterly data series by disaggregating our annual data to match our sample 
period of 1992q1-2015q2. Our disaggregating employs Boot-Feibes-Lisman (1967), 
Chow-Lin (1971), Fernandez (1981), Denton (1971) and Santos-Cardoso (2001), 
respectively. For four latter methods, we use the quarterly private non-financial debt 
level as the index. The disaggregated quarterly data series for China’s non-financial 
corporate debt level are reported in Figure 4 together with the actual data from BIS 
(2015) database.  
Figure 4 indicates that the disaggregated quarter data series from several 
methods are highly coincidental and are well fit with the quarterly data from BIS 
(2015) dataset that starts from 2016q1. To simplify, we use the data series estimated 
by Fernandez (1981) from 1992q1 to 2014 q2 in our study, and extend the data to 
2015 q2. 
    Figure 4 Disaggregated Quarterly Data for China’s Corporate Debt Levels 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
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4. Dynamic Equilibrium Debt Level for Non-Financial Corporations 
Measuring the overindebtedness in the public and private sector and thereby 
simulating the deleveraging process remains one of the most challenging empirical 
problems in macroeconomics because the equilibrium debt level is not observable. 
However, economic theory suggests that the equilibrium debt level is determined by 
the fundamental macroeconomic variables, which are observable. In this study, 
referring to the relevant literature (Guscina, 2008; Leland, 1994, Sun lixin (2015), 
Albuquerque et al., 2015), we assume that the equilibrium debt level of China’s 
non-financial corporate sector is determined by some fundamental macro forces, 
including economic growth, the interest rate, financial developments, then the 
long-run relationship between these fundamental variables and the corporate debt 
level suggests the equilibrium corporate debt level. As such, a VEC model can be 
employed to estimate the long-run relationship among these macro variables, and 
thereby calculating the dynamic equilibrium level of non-financial corporate debt. The 
chosen fundamental economic variables comprises the growth rates of GDP, the 
interbank interest rates, a development index of financial markets (proxied by the 
ratio of sum of total deposits and total loans to GDP), and the Shanghai Stock Index. 
Specifically, the VEC model is given by  
1( ) ,t t t t td d Y Y                                        (1) 
where 
1
4
.
.



 
 
 
 
 
 
 ,
1
4
.
.



 
 
 
 
 
 
 and t
Growth of  GDP
Inter - Bank Interest Rate
Y
Financial Development Index
Shanghai Stock Index
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
where td  denotes the ratio of corporate debt to GDP at time t , td is the first 
12 
 
difference of td  ( 1t td d  ),  and   are short-run error correction coefficients and 
long-run (cointegrating) coefficients, respectively. tY  represents the set of 
fundamental explanatory variables determining the long-run equilibrium (sustainable) 
corporate debt level, and   controls the spend of adjustment from the short-run to 
the long-run. t  denotes the external shock, which is an independent identical 
distributed white noise. 
    The sample period in our study is from 1992q1 to 2015q2. We conducted the unit 
root tests by suing ADF tests, the results show that all the variables are I(1). 
Furthermore, Cointegration tests indicate that there exists one long-run cointegrating 
relationship, which has been estimated by the above VEC model
6
.   
    The identified long-run relationship between the corporate leverage and the 
fundamental variables by the VEC model is 
    36.648 1.18 2.358 0.468 0.011 sin ,eqcorpdebtgdp ggdp ir findex s dex      (2) 
where eqcorpdebtgdp  denotes the dynamic equilibrium level of corporate debt 
(percent to GDP), ggdp  denotes growth rates of GDP, ir  represents the interbank 
interest rates, findex  is the development index of financial markets, and ssindex  
denotes the Shanghai Stock Index.  
The cointegrating equation (2) implies a negative correlation between the 
corporate equilibrium leverage and the economic growth in the long-run in China. 
Therefore, ceteris paribus, corporate deleveraging helps raise China’s economic 
growth to its long-run level.  
                                                             
6
 The results for unit root tests, cointegration tests, and the identified cointegrating equation and error 
correction models are shown in Appendix A.  
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In terms of the cointegrating equation (2), we calculated the equilibrium values 
of corporate debt level. Comparing the actual corporate debt level with its dynamic 
equilibrium values, we can judge if the corporate sector is overindebted, and if so, 
when and how much to deleverage for the corporate sector. Figure 5 presents the 
actual and equilibrium debt level of China’s non-financial corporate sector from 
1992q1 to 2015q2. The abrupt fall in the equilibrium level of corporate debt for the 
period of 2007q2-2008q1 is due to the dramatically fall in the Shanghai Stock Index 
from more than 7000 to approximately 2500 for the period, which reduced the market 
values of the listed firms and decreased their borrowing capability, thereby reducing 
the equilibrium debt level of the corporate sector.       
       Figure 5 Equilibrium and Actual Corporate Debt Level (percent to GDP) 
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    Figure 5 tells us that there are two periods in which the actual corporate debt level 
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exceeded the equilibrium debt level: the period of 1994q2-1998q4 and the period 
from 2013q4 onwards, implying two deleveraging processes over the sample period, 
respectively. The first deleveraging process had finished by the end of 1998, and the 
second one should have begun from the present (2015), on which is the focus of this 
study. At the standpoint of 2015q2, the gap between the actual leverage and the 
equilibrium level of China’s corporate debt is approximately 25% (to GDP), which 
would lead to a large fall in the growth rate of GDP in the future in accordance with 
equation (2).  
5. Effects of Macro Policies on Corporate Deleveraging 
As we have discussed in the section 2, macroeconomic policies are the most important 
measures of deleveraging. In this section, we test the effects of alternative 
macroeconomic policies on China’s non-financial corporate deleveraging and thereby 
provide the policy suggestions according to the empirical results.  
We focus on the monetary policy and fiscal policy in this study. The inter-bank 
interest rate and the growth rates of M2 are chosen as the instruments of China’s 
monetary policy. The respective instruments of China’s fiscal policy are the growth 
rates of government expenditure and the growth rates of tax revenue. In addition, the 
CPI and the national saving rate are added to the variable set. All the variables for the 
VEC model in section 4 are also used in this section. The sample period remains same 
as in section 4 from 1992q1 to 2015q2.  
Given the endogeneity of the chosen variables, we employ a VAR model to 
conduct our tests.  
A representative VAR can be expressed as  
15 
 
            ( ) ( )t t t tBX C L X D L Z                                  (3) 
where tX  is a (m x 1) vector of endogenous variables, tZ  is an n  vector of 
exogenous variables, B ,C  and D are matrices of the estimated coefficients, and L
is a lag operator. The error term t is a vector of innovations that are I.I.D. 
    Excluding the vector of exogenous variables, we obtain the reduced form of the 
VAR 
        ( )t t tX A L X                                      (4) 
where 1 2
1 2( ) ( ) ...
i
iA L B C L A L A L AL
       
where i  is the number of lag or the order of the VAR. 
  Given 
     1
t tB 
   
Then, equation (4) yields a MA representation:  
         
1
( )
[ ( )]
t t tX K L
I A L
  

                              (5) 
Equation (5) produces a structural form (an estimated VAR) which can provide 
the impulse response functions (hereafter IRF) for us to measure the effects of 
economic policies, and variance decomposition functions to trace the contributions of 
alternative shocks to economic fluctuations.  
The lag choice for our VAR model follows the Schwarz Information Criterion 
(SIC), which suggests 2 lags for our quarterly data. Our estimated VAR model 
satisfies the mathematical stability, and passes the misspecification tests such as 
normal distribution, autocorrelation, ARCH and heteroscedasticity
7
.    
 
                                                             
7
 The results of all diagnostic tests are reported in Appendix B.  
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5.1 Effects of Monetary Policy on Corporate Deleveraging 
We examine the effects of monetary policy on corporate deleveraging by analysing 
the IRFs to the shocks from the growth rates of M2 and the interbank interest rate, 
which simulate an expansionary and a contractionary monetary policy operation, 
respectively.  
Figures 6 and 7 show the effects of the shock from the growth rate of M2 and the 
shock from the interbank interest rate on the corporate deleveraging, respectively. 
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Figure 6 Effects of an Expansionary Monetary Shock (Innovation in Growth Rate of M2)  
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                      Figure 7 Effects of a Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock (Innovation in Interbank Rate) 
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In Figure 6, a one unit innovation in the growth rate of M2 increases the growth 
rate of M2 approximately 1.5%, which leads to an immediate fall in the interbank 
interest rate (approximately 2%), remarkable rises in the Shanghai stock index, the 
government spending and financial development index, and weak responses in the 
growth rate of GDP, CPI and the national saving rate, respectively. Most importantly, 
a positive monetary policy shock from the growth rate of M2 increases China’s 
corporate leverage ratio approximately 1% immediately. This implies that the 
monetarization channel of corporate deleveraging does not work in China! Because 
the main transmission channel of China’s monetary policy is the credit channel8, given 
that the banking industry is dominated by the so-called state-owned “Big Four” 
commercial banks and most important and large firms are also state-owned, when the 
Central Bank of China (the People’s Bank of China, hereafter the PBC) conducts an 
easy monetary policy, the loans are more easy available for these state owned firms, 
hence, the corporate leverage increases. This is a different story from that in most 
advanced economies, where the inflation effect (monetarizing the debtor’s burden and 
redistributing the wealth) dominates and thereby the “ugly deleveraging” works.  
Figure 7 shows that a positive shock to the interbank interest rate increases the 
interest rate approximately 0.8% (a contractionary monetary policy), which depresses 
the growth rate of GDP and the Shanghai stock index two quarters later, following by 
an immediate rise in these two indicators (hump shape). This contractionary monetary 
policy operation decreases the corporate leverage in the short-run (within 8 quarters), 
                                                             
8
 See, for example, Sun Lixin et al. (2010).  
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and then increases the corporate leverage in the medium term, implying an 
intertemporal trade-off between corporate deleveraging and leveraging.  
5.2 Effects of Fiscal Policy on Corporate Deleveraging 
Figures 8 and 9 depict the effects of a fiscal policy shock on China’s corporate 
deleveraging.  
    A positive shock to the government spending increases the growth rate of 
government spending approximately 3.2%, thereby raising the growth rate of GDP 
immediately approximately 1.6%. The responses of other macro variables are weak, 
however, corporate leverage rises approximately 0.5% immediately, suggesting that a 
positive fiscal policy operation by expanding the government expenditure would lead 
to higher leverage in the corporate sector in China. This result justifies the 
explanations on why China’s non-financial corporate sector accumulates one of the 
highest debt levels around the world: China had undertaken a huge fiscal stimulus 
package for weathering against the adverse spill over effects of the Global Financial 
Crisis. Therefore, an opposite direction operation in fiscal policy (contractionary 
fiscal policy) is expected to deleverage China’s corporates (Figure 8).  
    The empirical results from Figure 9 support the policy implications from Figure 
8: a negative fiscal policy by raising tax helps reduce the corporate leverage. An 
innovation in the growth rate of tax revenue increases the tax revenue and thereby 
depressing the growth rate of GDP. Approximately 5% rise in the growth rate of tax 
revenue leads to immediate fall (approximately 0.5%) in the corporate leverage 
(percent to GDP).  
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              Figure 8 Effects of a Positive Fiscal Policy (Expanding Government Expenditure) Shock on Corporate Deleveraging 
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                         Figure 9 Effects of a Contractionary Fiscal Policy (Raising Tax) Shock on Corporate Deleveraging 
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6. Conclusions 
Our study estimated the dynamic equilibrium debt level for non-financial corporates 
in China within a VEC model. The gap between the actual corporate debt-to-GDP 
ratio and the equilibrium debt level measures the magnitude of corporate deleveraging. 
Our estimation results suggest a reduction of 25% (of GDP) in corporate debt level, 
which would produce remarkable dragging effects on the growth rate of GDP in the 
future.  
Given that China’s corporate sector and banking industry are dominated by large 
state-owned firms and big state-owned commercial banks, respectively. The effects of 
macroeconomic policies on China’s corporate deleveraging have different 
pass-through from that occurred in advanced economies. It is contractionary monetary 
policy and fiscal policy that help reduce the leverage in China’s corporate sector. This 
is also because the increasing accumulation of debt in the corporate sector in recent 
years was driven by the monetary and fiscal stimulus package taken by China’s 
government to tackle with the spill over effects of the Global Financial Crisis. Thus, 
opposite macroeconomic policy stances, that is, the contractionary macroeconomic 
policies are suitable for current corporate deleveraging.  
It is unknown that our unique findings in the effects of macroeconomic policies 
on corporate deleveraging source from China’s unique economic structure or from the 
unique accumulation mechanism for current corporate debt. Our further research will 
focus on this issue.  
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Appendix A 
Table 1 Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests on Unit Roots for all variables  
 
No Variables Level First 
Difference 
Integration 
Order I( ) 
1 Growth Rate of GDP -1.7844 -8.5581* 1 
2 Growth rate of M2 -2.2468 -8.4086* 1 
3 Inter-Bank Interest rate -3.0228 -11.669* 1 
4 CPI  -2.1570 -2.0115 >1 
5 Financial Development Index 
((total loans + total deposits)/GDP) 
-0.2975 -4.0892* 1 
6 Shanghai Stock Market Index -1.454 -5.888* 1 
7 Corporate Debt Level (corporate 
debt-to-GDP ratio) 
1.2167 -7.005 1 
8 National Saving Rate -0.8857 -3.7629* 1 
9 Growth Rate of Government Spending -4.1847*  0 
10 Growth Rate of Tax Revenue -4.2884*  0 
 1% Critical Value* -3.502238 -3.502238  
 5% Critical Value** -2.892879 -2.892879  
 10% Critical Value*** -2.583553 -2.583553  
 
Table 2 Philips-Perron Tests on Unit Roots for CPI 
No Variables Level First Difference Order I( ) 
1 CPI  -2.0742 -9.869* 1 
 1% Critical Value* -3.502238 -3.502238  
 5% Critical Value** -2.892879 -2.892879  
 10% Critical Value*** -2.583553 -2.583553  
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Table 3 Results of Cointegration Tests. 
 
Sample (adjusted): 1997Q1 2015Q2   
Included observations: 74 after adjustments  
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Series: GGDP IR FINDEX SSINDEX RCOPORDEBTGDP   
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 3  
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.402683  75.82958  69.81889  0.0153 
At most 1  0.215382  37.69686  47.85613  0.3154 
At most 2  0.142653  19.74758  29.79707  0.4401 
At most 3  0.105205  8.358089  15.49471  0.4279 
At most 4  0.001785  0.132227  3.841466  0.7161 
     
      Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.402683  38.13272  33.87687  0.0146 
At most 1  0.215382  17.94928  27.58434  0.4994 
At most 2  0.142653  11.38949  21.13162  0.6084 
At most 3  0.105205  8.225862  14.26460  0.3562 
At most 4  0.001785  0.132227  3.841466  0.7161 
     
      Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
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Table 4 Cointegrating Equation and the Error Correction Equations 
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates    
 Sample (adjusted): 1997Q1 2015Q2    
 Included observations: 74 after adjustments   
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
      
      Cointegration Restrictions:     
      B(1,5)=1     
Convergence achieved after 1 iterations.   
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors   
      
      Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1     
      
      GGDP(-1)  1.180371     
  (1.02745)     
 [ 1.14883]     
IR(-1)  2.357810     
  (0.73712)     
 [ 3.19867]     
FINDEX(-1) -0.468351     
  (0.05814)     
 [-8.05529]     
SSINDEX(-1)  0.011190     
  (0.00242)     
 [ 4.63333]     
RCOPORDEBTGDP(-1)  1.000000     
C -38.64839     
      
      
Error Correction: D(GGDP) D(IR) D(FINDEX) D(SSINDEX) 
D(RCOPORDE
BTGDP) 
      
      CointEq1 -0.040319 -0.036572 -0.010124 -13.58470 -0.043549 
  (0.01039)  (0.01352)  (0.08226)  (5.94062)  (0.04051) 
 [-3.88148] [-2.70457] [-0.12307] [-2.28675] [-1.07498] 
      
D(GGDP(-1)) -0.035595  0.182840 -0.985775 -46.89014 -0.497792 
  (0.10808)  (0.14070)  (0.85589)  (61.8103)  (0.42151) 
 [-0.32934] [ 1.29954] [-1.15175] [-0.75861] [-1.18097] 
      
D(GGDP(-2)) -0.039585  0.008678 -0.276067  103.1247 -0.377677 
  (0.10835)  (0.14105)  (0.85806)  (61.9668)  (0.42258) 
 [-0.36533] [ 0.06152] [-0.32173] [ 1.66419] [-0.89375] 
      
D(GGDP(-3)) -0.190724  0.062990 -0.094961 -70.83227 -0.042261 
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  (0.10450)  (0.13603)  (0.82754)  (59.7625)  (0.40754) 
 [-1.82514] [ 0.46305] [-0.11475] [-1.18523] [-0.10370] 
      
D(IR(-1))  0.231367 -0.287157 -1.399503  35.69259 -0.672655 
  (0.10447)  (0.13599)  (0.82729)  (59.7445)  (0.40742) 
 [ 2.21473] [-2.11154] [-1.69168] [ 0.59742] [-1.65100] 
      
D(IR(-2)) -0.025008  0.169263 -0.631050 -53.03450 -0.660814 
  (0.10667)  (0.13886)  (0.84473)  (61.0043)  (0.41601) 
 [-0.23445] [ 1.21894] [-0.74704] [-0.86936] [-1.58845] 
      
D(IR(-3)) -0.162503  0.064181  0.650750 -49.16541  0.282590 
  (0.11120)  (0.14475)  (0.88058)  (63.5929)  (0.43367) 
 [-1.46141] [ 0.44338] [ 0.73900] [-0.77313] [ 0.65163] 
      
D(FINDEX(-1))  0.001643 -0.022792  0.268668 -11.71731 -0.028176 
  (0.02236)  (0.02911)  (0.17706)  (12.7868)  (0.08720) 
 [ 0.07349] [-0.78306] [ 1.51738] [-0.91636] [-0.32313] 
      
D(FINDEX(-2)) -0.021775 -0.028425 -0.458232 -11.09347 -0.048268 
  (0.02533)  (0.03298)  (0.20061)  (14.4878)  (0.09880) 
 [-0.85955] [-0.86193] [-2.28414] [-0.76571] [-0.48855] 
      
D(FINDEX(-3))  0.034289 -0.050741  0.068156 -4.284061 -0.028915 
  (0.02613)  (0.03402)  (0.20693)  (14.9441)  (0.10191) 
 [ 1.31219] [-1.49165] [ 0.32936] [-0.28667] [-0.28373] 
      
D(SSINDEX(-1))  0.000950  4.48E-05 -0.000895  0.552691 -9.52E-05 
  (0.00024)  (0.00031)  (0.00187)  (0.13470)  (0.00092) 
 [ 4.03263] [ 0.14608] [-0.47979] [ 4.10306] [-0.10359] 
      
D(SSINDEX(-2)) -0.000259  0.000193  0.000529 -0.225683  0.000247 
  (0.00025)  (0.00033)  (0.00200)  (0.14465)  (0.00099) 
 [-1.02251] [ 0.58598] [ 0.26433] [-1.56019] [ 0.25082] 
      
D(SSINDEX(-3))  0.000998  0.000692 -0.003318  0.250646 -0.000978 
  (0.00026)  (0.00033)  (0.00203)  (0.14629)  (0.00100) 
 [ 3.89963] [ 2.07835] [-1.63784] [ 1.71333] [-0.98066] 
      
D(RCOPORDEBTGDP(-1))  0.025916  0.105075  0.207682  15.08017  0.288891 
  (0.04331)  (0.05637)  (0.34294)  (24.7665)  (0.16889) 
 [ 0.59845] [ 1.86386] [ 0.60559] [ 0.60890] [ 1.71051] 
      
D(RCOPORDEBTGDP(-2))  0.038081  0.040734  0.537662  45.83166  0.159484 
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  (0.04577)  (0.05958)  (0.36245)  (26.1748)  (0.17850) 
 [ 0.83203] [ 0.68368] [ 1.48343] [ 1.75098] [ 0.89349] 
      
D(RCOPORDEBTGDP(-3)) -0.007170  0.030091  0.281303  0.583638  0.316874 
  (0.04797)  (0.06244)  (0.37987)  (27.4329)  (0.18708) 
 [-0.14947] [ 0.48189] [ 0.74053] [ 0.02128] [ 1.69383] 
      
C -0.186778 -0.131434  1.266273  7.723060  0.334440 
  (0.09115)  (0.11866)  (0.72183)  (52.1284)  (0.35548) 
 [-2.04913] [-1.10768] [ 1.75426] [ 0.14815] [ 0.94080] 
      
       R-squared  0.508052  0.306749  0.372823  0.357399  0.357419 
 Adj. R-squared  0.369961  0.112152  0.196773  0.177020  0.177045 
 Sum sq. resids  26.44481  44.81462  1658.420  8649234.  402.2254 
 S.E. equation  0.681134  0.886691  5.393985  389.5394  2.656424 
 F-statistic  3.679120  1.576329  2.117713  1.981378  1.981544 
 Log likelihood -66.92826 -86.44481 -220.0550 -536.7514 -167.6405 
 Akaike AIC  2.268331  2.795806  6.406892  14.96625  4.990284 
 Schwarz SC  2.797644  3.325118  6.936204  15.49557  5.519596 
 Mean dependent -0.039624 -0.136351  2.172998  45.40816  0.991589 
 S.D. dependent  0.858122  0.941029  6.018533  429.3948  2.928257 
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Appendix B Diagnostic Tests for VAR model 
Table 5 Mathematical Stability Tests: 
 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: GGDP GM2 IR GGOVERN GTR 
CPI2000 FINDEX SSINDEX SAVING 
RCOPORDEBTGDP  
Exogenous variables: C T  
Lag specification: 1 2 
  
       Root Modulus 
  
   0.974715 + 0.029458i  0.975160 
 0.974715 - 0.029458i  0.975160 
 0.874157 + 0.190873i  0.894753 
 0.874157 - 0.190873i  0.894753 
 0.817438 - 0.252113i  0.855433 
 0.817438 + 0.252113i  0.855433 
 0.701229 - 0.401512i  0.808043 
 0.701229 + 0.401512i  0.808043 
 0.024250 - 0.783853i  0.784228 
 0.024250 + 0.783853i  0.784228 
 0.184287 + 0.490836i  0.524291 
 0.184287 - 0.490836i  0.524291 
-0.424485  0.424485 
 0.413533 + 0.043019i  0.415765 
 0.413533 - 0.043019i  0.415765 
-0.221882 + 0.315248i  0.385504 
-0.221882 - 0.315248i  0.385504 
-0.107667  0.107667 
 0.019505 + 0.105022i  0.106818 
 0.019505 - 0.105022i  0.106818 
  
   No root lies outside the unit circle. 
 VAR satisfies the stability condition. 
 
 
 
 
